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INTRODUCTION

On November 6, 1991, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit held, in United States v. Abello-Silva, that the
international extradition "doctrine of specialty," which requires
that an extradited accused felon not be tried for any charges be-
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yond those specified in the extradition request, bars only the introduction of different "offenses," and not the introduction of different "facts."' Reasoning that no violation of the doctrine occurred
when the prosecution secured a drug conspiracy conviction against
an extradited Colombian citizen with facts different from those
specified in its extradition request to the Colombian government,
the court affirmed the conviction.2
Because it is well established that an asylum country will "extradite only those individuals against whom a substantial case
lies,' '3 the Abello-Silva decision may encourage U.S. prosecutors to
tender trumped-up charges to foreign governments when a case is
weak and likely to be met with a refusal to extradite. By using the
rule that an extradited criminal defendant may be tried on facts
completely different from those specified in an extradition request,
prosecutors may under color of U.S. law affirmatively mislead foreign governments as to the nature and quality of the evidence obtained. Although there is little doubt that the holding will help the
government in its self-declared "War on Drugs," ethical questions
abound over this extraterritorial license to mislead.
This Note discusses the specialty doctrine's theoretical justification and history. Next it analyzes Abello-Silva and focuses on its
narrow holding. The Note then examines the decision's practical
implications and concludes that the court's effort to aid the government's war on drugs produced a result which violates the specialty doctrine's spirit and offends international moral norms.
II.

THE SPECIALTY DOCTRINE

When a host country grants another country's extradition request, the specialty doctrine requires that the defendant be tried
1. United States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1174-76 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 107 (1992), and reh'g denied, 113 S. Ct. 1068 (1993).
2. In doing so, the court also determined that: (1) the defendant Abello had standing to
raise the doctrine (as opposed to reserving that right exclusively to the government of Colombia); and (2) that American law, not Colombian law, applied to determine whether different facts were tantamount to different offenses. Id. at 1173-74.
Beyond the scope of this Note are the court's rulings that: (1) pre-trial publicity did not
render the Northern District of Oklahoma an improper venue; (2) the defense was not denied access to exculpatory "Brady" material; and (3) the trial was not tainted by alleged
inflammatory comments made by the prosecutor during closing arguments. Id. at 1176-84.
3. Id. at 1173-74 (following United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962)).
The court went on to say, "In other words, we examine whether there is sufficient evidence
in the request for extradition ... ." Id. at 1174.
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only for offenses specified in the request.4 The doctrine holds that,
when a requesting state attempts to prosecute an extradited defendant for any offense not indicated in the request for extradition, the defendant must be afforded an opportunity to leave the
prosecuting state-' Although the traditional view was that violation
of the doctrine could only be raised by the surrendering state,'
courts have expressly held that the extradited defendant also has
standing to raise violations of the doctrine, even when the surrendering country apparently has raised no objection.7
The doctrine's rationale rests on procedural and political considerations. M. Cherif Bassiouni, in his treatise on extradition, lists
five precise factors justifying the rule that extradited defendants
may only be tried for the offenses specified in the extradition request: 1) The surrendering country might not have extradited the
defendant for prosecution of the omitted offense; 2) the requesting
4. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 424 (1886); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 359-60 (rev. 2d ed. 1987).
5. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 424; BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 359-60.

6. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S.
884 (1973); Berenguer v. Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (D.D.C. 1979).
7. United States v. Levy, 905 F.2d 326, 328 n.1 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
759 (1991); accord United States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1173 (10th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 107 (1992) (reaffirming Levy holding that "a criminal defendant may raise
the issue himself"); United States v. Vreeken, 803 F.2d 1085, 1088 (10th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1067 (1987); United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE

§ 477 reporters' note 1 (1987); see also United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d
146, 151 (8th Cir. 1987).
Traditionally, the defendant lacked standing and could not raise any objection to prosecution; such an objection was "a privilege of the asylum state, designed to protect its dignity
and interests, rather than a right accruing to the accused." Shapiro,478 F.2d at 906. Yet the
Tenth Circuit, in Levy, suggested that such a tradition was ill-founded, citing 104-year-old
language in Rauscher which declared that the doctrine was a "right conferred upon persons
brought from a foreign country," Levy, 905 F.2d at 328 n.1 (quoting Rauscher, 119 U.S. at
424), and that "any person prosecuted in any court within the United States has the right to
claim the protection" of the doctrine, id. (quoting Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 433 (Gray, J., concurring)). As noted above, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits agree with the Tenth Circuit's
position on standing. In United States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1012 (1989), the Ninth Circuit first cited the traditional rule against standing and
then decided to "adhere to the opposing position, allowing petitioner to raise claims which
might have been raised by the asylum state." Id. at 1427 n.23.
In addition, Bassiouni views the doctrine as a rule of international law, "the breach of
which gives rise to a relator's right to object to prosecutorial variance. . . even without the
intervention or objection of the requested state." BASSIOUNI, supro note 4, at 368 n.147. It
appears that Bassiouni's view of the traditional rule for standing in specialty cases is taking
hold, and as Abello is a Tenth Circuit case, this Note assumes that a criminal defendant has
standing at trial to raise the doctrine of specialty even in the absence of objection by the
former asylum state.
UNITED STATES
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state would lack in personam jurisdiction over the defendant had
the host country not surrendered him; 3) the requesting state
would not have been able to prosecute the defendant were he not
surrendered by the host country; 4) "the requesting state would be
abusing a formal process to secure the surrender of the person it
seeks by relying on the requested Stated, which will use its
processes to effectuate the surrender;" 8 and-perhaps most important for the purposes of this Note-5) the host country allows extradition solely in reliance upon the representations made to it by
the requesting country."
Extradition treaties usually incorporate the specialty doctrine,
but when no treaty exists, courts enforce the doctrine as a rule of
international law10 or as a matter of international comity." Naturally, when a treaty controls, its language determines the doctrine's
procedural effect. Treaties may limit prosecution to: 1) the specific
offense alleged in the extradition request; 2) "any extraditable offense" appended to the offense which secured extradition; or 3) the
offense indicated in the request and any other offense upon proof
12
of the facts on which the extradition request was based.
A.

The Polestar: United States v. Rauscher

The United States Supreme Court adopted the specialty doc8
trine in 1886 in United States v. Rauscher." Rauscher was a
United States seaman who fled to England after indictment for inflicting "cruel and unusual" punishment upon another." Because
the extradition treaty between the United States and England did
not recognize such a crime, federal prosecutors tendered an extra5
dition request charging Rauscher with "murder."' On that basis,
England extradited Rauscher. The U.S. government subsequently
8. BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 360.
9. Id.
10. See United States v. Kaufman, 858 F.2d 994, 1007 n.4, (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that
"[tihe rule of specialty is a general rule of international law"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 895
(1989); Shapiro, 478 F.2d at 906; see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 368 n.147; Steven A.
Bernholz et al., InternationalExtradition in Drug Cases, 10 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. R.G.
353, 365 (1985).
11. See United States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417, 1426 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The doctrine is
based on principles of international comity."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989); United
States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146, 151 (8th Cir. 1987).
12. Bernholz, supra note 10, at 365.
13. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
14. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 409.
15. Id.
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tried and convicted him on the "infliction of 'cruel and unusual'
punishment" offense alleged in the indictment. He was not tried
for "murder."1 6 The United States Supreme Court reversed the
conviction, upholding the rule of specialty "that [the defendant]
shall be tried only for the offense with which he is charged in the
extradition proceedings.""7
In Abello-Silva, the Tenth Circuit faced an issue similar to
that in Rauscher, but with a twist. 18 The offense for which the government prosecuted Abello was nominally the same offense as alleged in the request, right down to the statute number. 19 However,
the facts used at trial, which had been alleged in a second superseding indictment issued after extradition, were facts different
from those alleged in the extradition request.20 The court faced a
question of first impression: Did the specialty doctrine apply to the
utilization of different "facts," as opposed to the imposition of different offenses? That is, did the specialty doctrine proscribe prosecution where the facts used at trial were different from the facts
used to request and secure extradition?
B. Interplay Between Facts and Offenses: The Precedent
Before Abello-Silva, courts had skirted, but never squarely
faced the "fact-offense" dilemma. On one hand, if courts did not
wish to reward Rauscher-type prosecutors who allege one offense
to secure extradition, only to try the defendant on another, why
should they reward a prosecutor who might use facts in the same
way? On the other hand, if an offense is an extraditable one and
the defendant's trial is for that offense, doesn't this end the inquiry? The latter approach makes sense, especially since it is inevitable that facts will be disproved as new evidence comes to light
between the time of extradition and the trial itself.
No case until Abello-Silva specifically dealt with the "different facts" question. Some courts, however, had touched upon it.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 424.
18. United States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 113 S. Ct.
107 (1992).
19. Id. at 1176.
20. Id. at 1172.
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1. United States v. Sensi
In United States v. Sensi,2 1 the defendant, extradited from
Great Britain, appealed his conviction of various offenses, including mail fraud, larceny, embezzlement, and receipt of stolen securities." He argued that the charges for which he was convicted violated the specialty doctrine either because the extradition request
did not name them or because the British extradition order did not
include them. s The court held that the specific facts in the extradition request justified all the charges."
Article XII of the Extradition Treaty 5 between the United
States and Great Britain proscribed a defendant's prosecution "for
any offense other than an extraditable offense established by the
26
facts in respect of which his extradition has been granted.
Sensi argued that the Treaty required prosecutors to establish a
nexus between the "facts" and an extraditable offense specifically
included in the extradition request and order. " ' The court held
that facts used in the request, which reasonably supported an ex8
traditable offense, also satisfied the Treaty's requirements.
Although the facts/offenses distinction was tangential to the
holding-Sensi challenged the "offenses" rather than the
facts-the court did address it. Stressing the importance of studying whether the "facts" supporting the request sufficiently justified
extradition under the Treaty, the court stated: "[T]he charges
against Sensi must have been 'established by the facts in respect of
which his extradition was granted.' Thus, the test focuses on the
evidentiary material that was submitted to the [British]
'2

magistrate.

9

Had the facts in the extradition request not established an offense, the court would have reversed Sensi's conviction. This suggestion, implicit in Sensi, follows from Bassiouni's fifth justifica21. 879 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
22. Id. at 891-92.
23. Id. at 895.
24. Id. at 896.
25. Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, art. XII, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.T. 227, 233 [hereinafter U.S.-U.K. Treaty].
26. U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 25, art. XII(1), 28 U.S.T. at 233 (emphasis added).
27. 879 F.2d at 895.
28. Id. at 896.
29. Id. 879 F.2d at 896 (emphasis added) (quoting the U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra, note 25,
art. XII, 28 U.S.T. at 233).
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tion for the specialty rule: the surrendering country allows
extradition solely in reliance upon the representations made to it
by the requesting country.30 When those representations are inade1
quate or misleading, prosecution is impermissible.3
2.

United States v. Cuevas

United States v. Cuevas"s was a multi-count narcotics and
currency reporting conspiracy case. The defendant argued for dismissal of the currency-related counts because the extradition order
33
enjoined prosecution for any "fiscal aspects" of an alleged crime.
The court's specialty inquiry, therefore, centered not on the
charged offense, but on whether the facts alleged encompassed
those "fiscal aspects" of conduct protected from prosecution. 4
As in Sensi, the defendant in Cuevas challenged prosecutorial
variance of alleged offenses,"5 rather than facts. Cuevas is important in that it shows that a U.S. court may address the adequacy of
facts underpinning an extradition request and may assess whether
the request violated principles of what the Cuevas court termed
"international comity."" The Ninth Circuit held that no violation
of the specialty doctrine occurred when the narcotics and currency
reporting conspiracies alleged in the extradition request were on
their face "integrally related. ' 3 7 However, it is significant that the
court framed the "appropriate test" as "whether the extraditing
country would consider the acts for which the defendant was pros30. BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 360; see also supra text accompanying note 9.

31. An interesting question raised by Abello-Silva is whether there is any substantive
difference between facts in an extradition request which "inadequately" support an alleged
offense and facts in an extradition request which are false in their entirety.
32. 847 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989).
33. Cuevas, 847 F.2d at 1426. The United States extradited Cuevas from Switzerland.
The relevant treaty section prohibited the United States from prosecuting a person "for any
offense, committed before the demand for extradition, other than that for which the extradition is granted." Treaty on Extradition, May 14, 1900, U.S.-Switz., art. IX, 31 Stat. 1928,
1932 [hereinafter U.S.-Swiss Treaty]. The Swiss court's extradition order contained an injunction against prosecution "of the fiscal aspect of the factual circumstances of the indictment." 847 F.2d at 1427 (citation omitted).
34. 847 F.2d at 1427.
35. Cuevas's argument was not that the factual introduction of the "fiscal aspects" of a
crime triggered the specialty doctrine's protection, but rather that the introduction of those
aspects triggered the doctrine when the alleged offense itself served to criminalize the fiscal
conduct introduced. Id. at 1426-28.
36. Id. at 1426.
37. Id. at 1428.
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ecuted as independent from those for which he was extradited."3
3. United States v. Paroutian
In United States v. Paroutian,39 the case from which the Cuevas court derived its "test,"40 Lebanon extradited the defendant to
the United States in response to a request which included a copy
41
of an indictment issued in the Southern District of New York.
The government tried Paroutian, however, on an indictment issued
42
in the Eastern District of New York after his extradition. Both
indictments contained the same facts, but alleged somewhat different drug offenses.

43

Rejecting Paroutian's specialty argument, the court wrote that
the term "separate offense" under the doctrine should be broadly
construed; the term's construction should not be left to "some
technical refinement of local law," but rather, should turn on
"whether the extraditing country would consider the offense actually tried 'separate.' """ The court ruled that in an acceptable, albeit general sense, Paroutian's conviction waq fnr th onmP t.y io f
offense for which Lebanon expected him to be tried-illegal trafficking of drugs.45
The doctrine, the court wrote, was "designed to protect the
extraditing government against abuse of its discretionary act of extradition. ' 46 Consequently, the court explicitly based its holding on
the firm belief that the Lebanese government was, via the extradition request, "fully apprised of the facts" upon which the conviction was secured.4 7 Had the Lebanese government not been "fully
apprised of the facts" by the request, it seems likely that the court
38. Id. (citing United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1962)).
39. 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962).
40. Cuevas, 847 F.2d at 1428.
41. Paroutian,299 F.2d at 490.
42. Id.
43. Id. Paroutian was convicted of "knowingly and unlawfully receiving and concealing"
heroin and "conspiring with another to import [the drug] into the United States, to receive,
conceal, and sell it, and to facilitate itstransportation, concealment, and sale-all in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 174." 299 F.2d at 487. The original indictment sent to Lebanon did not
include the first two counts, receiving and concealing heroin. But during the extradition
proceedings, the United States provided Lebanese officials with all the factual information
supporting the two counts. Id. at 490.
44. 299 F.2d at 491.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 490.
47. Id. at 491
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would have reached the opposite result.'8

III. THE ABELLO-SILVA CASE
A.

The Facts at Trial

Colombia extradited its citizen, Jos6 Rafael Abello-Silva, to
the United States in late 1989 to face drug conspiracy charges.'9 A
federal court convicted and sentenced him to serve
two concurrent
50
thirty-year terms and to pay a $5 million fine.

In May, 1987, Boris Olarte, a Colombian drug-dealer extradited from Panama and jailed in the Northern District of
Oklahoma, agreed to cooperate with the United States government.5 ' Olarte claimed that in 1986 he had met Abello and two
other co-conspirators in Aruba to orchestrate an attempt at smuggling cocaine into the United States. 5 ' The parties abandoned that
plan, but, cooperating with the F.B.I., Olarte attempted to revive
the deal from prison by contacting the participants through Clara
Lacle, his common-law wife.53 Consequently, two F.B.I. agents and
Lacle travelled to Fort Pierce, Florida 5" to meet Palmero and Jamieson.5" The F.B.I. arrested Palmero and Jamieson and indicted
them and Abello on September 2, 1987, on drug trafficking conspiracy charges.56 A superseding indictment followed on October 7,
48. This is particularly so because the Paroutiancourt was not result-oriented. It reversed Paroutian's conviction on other grounds: admission at trial of evidence obtained in a
search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 489, 491.
49. United States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 107 (1992).
50. 948 F.2d at 1171. Abello's conviction was for conspiring to import drugs in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 963 and § 960(b)(1)(B), (G); and for conspiring to possess with the intent to
distribute; and distribution of drugs, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A). Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1171.
51. 948 F.2d at 1172. Senior Colorado District Judge John L. Kane, Jr., sitting by designation, blithely wrote that Olarte decided to cooperate because he was "unhappy in his
surroundings." Id. In fact, before making his deal to cooperate with the U.S. government,
Olarte made numerous attempts to escape from prison. Richard L. Fricker, The Abello Conspiracy, A.B.A.J., Dec. 1990, at 54, 63.
52. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1172. The two alleged co-conspirators were Francisco
Palmero, a Fort Pierce, stockbroker, and Robert Jamieson, a Miami commercial fisherman.
See Fricker, supra note 51, at 55; Colombia Hands U.S. A Key Cocaine Suspect, MIAMI
HERALD, Oct. 30, 1989, at A9 [hereinafter Key Cocaine Suspect].
53. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1172.
54. Id.
55. Id.; Fricker, supra note 51, at 54-63.
56. Fricker,supra note 51, at 54-63.
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On October 20, 1989, the United States formally requested extradition of Abello, citing and-including a copy of the indictment
of October 7, 1987, in its request.6 8 That indictment contained a
"lengthy discussion of the drug conspiracy but only a brief mention of Abello." 5 9 The extradition request itself only mentioned
Abello twice, simply claiming that "Abello-Silva and his associates" planned on this one occasion to smuggle cocaine into the
United States.60 Pursuant to Colombian Presidential Decree No.
1860 of August, 1989,61 which permits the extradition of Colombian
nationals, Colombia extradited Abello late in October, 1989.2 The
Decree, as Colombian authorities initially interpreted it, superseded any extradition treaty previously in force. 3
In the United States, a flurry of major newspaper reports
linked Abello to the infamous Medellin Drug Cartel, claiming he
was one of its leaders. 6 4 Though the superseding indictment and
57. Abell-Silva, 948 F.2d at ii72.

58. Id.
59. Id. (emphasis added). "In the 31 overt acts listed in the indictment, Palmero is
named in 29 . . .Jamieson in four; Abello is named in one-a March 1987 meeting with
Jamieson, Palmero and 'others' in Aruba to discuss the importation of cocaine." Fricker,
supra note 51, at 56.
In a letter published in the A.B.A. Journal,Assistant Attorney General Robert S.Mueller responded to Fricker's article on the Abello extradition and trial: "The 1987 indictment
did not detail Abello's role in the conspiracy because at that time there was no expectation
Abello ever would be extradited to the United States from Colombia." Robert S. Mueller,
The Justice Department Responds to "The Abello Conspiracy," A.B.A.J., Mar. 1991, at 16.
60. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1172.
61. Decree No. 1860 of 1989, DIAso OFICIAL, Aug. 18, 1989, at 5 (Colom.) [hereinafter
Colombian Decree No. 18601.
62. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1171, 1175.
63. See Mark Andrew Sherman, United States InternationalDrug Control Policy, Extradition, and the Rule of Law in Colombia, 15 NOVA L. REV. 661, 690-95 (1991).
At the time of Abello's extradition, the United States had an extradition treaty in force
with Colombia under which it could have sought properly his extradition. Extradition
Treaty, Sept. 14, 1979, U.S.-Colom., S. TREATY Doc. No., 8, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981),
reprinted in EXTRADITION LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE U.S. § 140.1 (Igor I. Kavass & Adolf
Sprudzs eds., 1989) [hereinafter 1979 U.S.-Colom. Treaty].
Five weeks after AbeUo's extradition, the Colombian Supreme Court of Justice ruled
that Decree No. 1860 was subordinate to the 1979 Extradition Treaty between Colombia
and the United States. See infra text accompanying notes 109-14.
64. See, e.g., Colombian Drug Suspect Extradited, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1989, at A20;
Key Cocaine Suspect, supra note 52, at A9; Medellin Suspect Extradited to U.S., N.Y.
Timis, Oct. 30, 1989, at A13 see also Sherman, supra note 63, at 667 n.12.
The story also spread overseas. See, e.g., Colombia Hands Over Drug Suspect, THE
TimES (London), Oct. 30, 1989, at 10.
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extradition request did not link Abello with the Cartel, 5 after
Abello's extradition, a spokesman for the United States Drug Enforcement Administration told the press that Abello "was considered a major transporter" and was the number four person in the
Medellin organization."'
Before their trial commenced, Abello's purported co-conspirators pleaded guilty and promised to testify against him in exchange
for lenient sentences. 7 With the extradited Abello now in U.S. custody, the government issued a second superseding indictment
against him as the lone defendant. 8 Whereas the superseding indictment tendered in the extradition request charged all four coconspirators for only one event-participating in the abandoned
1986 Aruba plan to import cocaine 169 -the new indictment charged
Abello with a range of newly alleged drug activity, including the
importation of marijuana. 0 New factual allegations expanded the
mechanics of his "operation," his links to the "Medellin" and
"Cali" drug cartels, and his relationships with drug kingpins Pablo
Escobar-Gaviria, Jos6 Gonzalo Rodriguez-Gacha, and Jorge Ochoa71
Vasquez.
After a trial where "[t]he only testimony as to Abello's participation in the alleged conspiracy was that of his former co-defendants, persons related to his former co-defendants, other convicts,
65. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1172.
66. See, e.g., Medellin Suspect Extradited to U.S., supra note 64, at A13 (Abello "considered a major transporter for the Medellin Cartel" by the U.S.); Suspect Is Extradited,
NEWSDAY, Oct. 30, 1989, at 12 (stating AbeUo is the number four person in the "notorious
Medellin drug cartel").
U.S. officials also told the press that Abello oversaw the entire north coast of Colombia
for the Medellin Cartel. See, e.g., Colombian Drug Suspect Extradited, supra note 64, at
A20; Key Cocaine Suspect, supra note 52, at A17.
67. Sherman, supra note 63, at 667 n.12.
Palmero was initially sentenced to 16 years in prison, but after Abello's conviction,
Judge Brett, who presided over Abello's trial, reduced Palmero's sentence to time served
and five years probation. Palmero now works in Florida. Fricker, supra note 51, at 68.
Judge Brett delayed Jamieson's sentencing until the Abello trial finished. Although
Jamieson faced life in prison, his cooperation in Abello-Silva and other cases resulted in a
suspended sentence of five years and a six-month stay in a Florida pre-release center. Id.
The Judge sentenced Olarte to 10 years in the custody of the U.S. Attorney General in
June of 1989. Corrections, A.B.A.J., Mar. 1991, at 18. In addition, the government dropped
in its entirety a continuing criminal enterprise charge under which he faced a possible 50year prison term and a $10.5 million fine. Fricker, supra note 51, at 55.
68. See Abe lo-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1172; Sherman, supra note 63, at 667 n.12.
69. See Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1172 (quoting Request for Extradition).
70. 948 F.2d at 1172-73 (explaining the second superseding indictment issued on January 3, 1990).
71. Id.
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and Federal Bureau of Investigation Agents, '72 the jury convicted
Abello and the court sentenced him to the maximum thirty years
in prison allowed under Colombian Decree No. 1860."
B.

The Appeal

On appeal, Abello sought to overturn his conviction under the
doctrine of specialty. Abello argued that though the nominal "offenses" at both the trial and in the extradition request were the
same, they were not truly identical as a matter of substance."
Abello claimed that the imposition, after extradition, of what
amounted to an entirely new set of facts and alleged acts, violated
the spirit of the doctrine. The U.S. government's actions, he argued, deprived Colombia of the ability to consider the extradition
request under Colombian law with the requisite knowledge of the
true scope and nature of the pending charges. Such consideration
would ignore whether the "refinement[s] of local (U.S.] law" 75 were
such that the two sets of facts fell-or 7' could be made to
Pfu,-within the same pigeon-holed "offense. 1
Additionally, because the broad facts alleged at trial differed
so fundamentally from the facts in the extradition request (which
only charged Abello for his participation in the "Aruba" incident),
Abello argued that under Paroutian,7 the United States should
have afforded the Colombian government an opportunity to decide
whether the new charges constituted a new and separate matter."
Finally, Abello cited Sensi 7e and Cuevas ° for the proposition that
the facts supplied in an extradition request are germane to any
72. Sherman, supra note 63, at 667 n.12.
73. 948 F.2d at 1171, 1171 n.1; see Colombian Decree No. 1860, supra note 61, art. 8(a).
74. 948 F.2d at 1172-73.
75. United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1962).
76. 948 F.2d at 1173. Although Abello based his argument on articles 650 and 651 of the
1987 Colombian Code of Criminal Procedure, 948 F.2d at 1173, plainly not lost on him was
the unique, purely political process of extradition under Colombian Decree No. 1860. The
Decree transferred sole discretion to extradite to the executive branch and withdrew the
judiciary's power under Colombian extradition treaties. Colombian Decree No. 1860, supra
note 61; see Sherman, supra note 63, at 694-95. Thus, political rather than legal considerations would control any decision to extradite. And as this Note later discusses, politically
there is a great difference in Colombia between extraditing a "low-level" importer and extraditing a reputed Medellin Cartel leader.
77. 299 F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d Cir. 1962).
78. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1173.
79. 879 F.2d 888, 895-96 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
80. 847 F.2d 1417, 1428 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989).

LICENSE TO MISLEAD

1992]

judicial determination of whether it violates the doctrine of
specialty.8 1
The government responded that the only relevant inquiry is
whether the defendant's conviction was for the same "offenses" alleged in the extradition request.2 The doctrine of specialty, argued
the government, relates only to prosecutorial variance of "offenses," not of "facts. '83 When the charged offense was the same,
there was no violation of the doctrine, regardless of whether the
actual "facts" alleged in the extradition request had been expanded or narrowed between the time of extradition and the time
of trial.

4

The Tenth Circuit agreed.

Regarding Abello's argument that under Colombian law the
new facts constituted separate offenses, the court reasoned that
Colombian law would be relevant only in two situations: (i) when
U.S. precedent required application of foreign law; or (ii) when a
treaty so mandated.8 5 The court found neither situation existed.8 6
It said that the passage from Paroutiancited by Abello, that "the
test whether trial is for a 'separate offense' should be not some
technical refinement of local law, but whether the extraditing
country would consider the offense actually tried 'separate,' "87 referred only to Colombia's interest in preventing prosecutions
wholly beyond the ambit of the charged offense for which it extradited the defendant.8 8 The passage was not "a statement about international choice of laws." 8
Of particular significance was the court's characterization and
subsequent application of the test for specialty doctrine violations:
The Paroutiancourt recognized the asylum country's desire to
extradite only those individuals against whom a substantial case
lies. A reviewing court places itself in the position of the asylum
country and inquires whether the asylum state would consent to
the extradition. In other words, we examine whether there is
sufficient evidence in the request for extradition to grant the
81. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1174-75.
82. Id. at 1173.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Paroutian, 299 F.2d. at 490-91.
88. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1173.
89. Id.
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request."
Applying the "sufficient evidence" test of the final sentence
above, the court found that Colombia had reviewed the extradition
request and clearly decided that sufficient evidence existed to extradite Abello for the offense alleged. 1 It reasoned that the different, more inculpatory, evidence introduced at trial would have only
2
bolstered Colombia's decision to extradite Abello.9
The court also wrote that the doctrine of specialty is not "a
vehicle for discovery" and that therefore it is permissible to introduce some evidence at trial which was not included in the extradition request.9 The extradition request, the court wrote, is not the
"definitive document" in the government's case.94
Finally, regarding the rule that the treaty's language bound
the United States, the court noted that Colombian Decree No.
1860 included "few limitations."95 It used that observation to distinguish the cases of Sensi and Cuevas, raised by Abello. 6
The Tenth Circuit candidly acknowledged that the Sensi and
Cuevas courts focused on the facts underpinning the extradition
request in determining whether the request violated the doctrine."'
However, those cases fell under the doctrine's "bound by Treaty"
prong because both involved extradition treaties whose language
drew a "facts-offenses" nexus which the court found lacking in Decree No. 1860.98 Although Sensi did "requir[e] a correspondence
between the charges . . . and the facts presented" to the extraditing country, it was distinguishable from Abello-Silva because the
Extradition Treaty between the United States and Great Britain
provided that an offense must be "established by the facts in re90. Id. at 1173-74. Curiously, the court treated the last sentence as a restatement of the

second sentence. To suggest that a question which asks "whether the asylum state would
consent to extradition" is the same as asking "whether there is sufficient evidence in the
request" conflates two distinct inquiries. It ignores that an asylum state may deny extradition for a host of political reasons and other legal considerations unique to that state. This
is true even if "sufficient evidence" reasonably supports the contention that the accused is
guilty of the claimed offense. See discussion infra notes 120-38 and accompanying text.
91. 948 F.2d at 1175.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1174. The court relied on the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 477 cmt. c (1987).
94. 948 F.2d at 1174.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1174-75.
97. Id. at 1175.
98. Id. at 1174-75.
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spect of which ... extradition has been granted," whereas Decree

No. 1860 did not.s9 Discussing Cuevas, the Abello-Silva court took
a similar view of the Swiss extradition order's unique "fiscal aspect" bar in the context of the Extradition Treaty between the
United States and Switzerland.100
Therefore, the Abello-Silva court held:
[T]he doctrine of specialty requires the defendant be tried only
for those offenses which appear in the extradition request....
Count one of the second superseding indictment charges Abello
with committing the same offenses and lists the identical code
sections ....

Count two of the second superseding indictment also charges
Abello with the same offenses and refers to the identical code
sections. Because both counts of the second superseding indictment charge Abello with the same offenses as are mentioned in
the extradition request, we find no violation of the specialty
doctrine.' 0'
IV.

DIFFICULTIES WITHIN THE CONFINES OF ABELLO-SILVA

The Abello-Silva court's rigid interpretation of the specialty
doctrine might well give an ostensible boost to the federal government's "War on Drugs." The decision offers little, however, in
precedential substance or theoretical soundness to American law.
It misapprehended both the spirit of the specialty doctrine and
principles of international comity. One fantastic leap of faith, central to the court's holding, resulted in a finding grounded solely in
wishful thinking.
A.

Use of Legal Precedent

The Tenth Circuit distinguished those cases cited by Abello.
As the court "acknowledged," those cases affirmatively scrutinized
the facts tendered in an extradition request to determine whether
the specialty doctrine had been violated.1 02 The basis of the court's
99. Id. at 1174-75, 1175 n.3 (citing U.S.-U.K Treaty, supra note 25, art. XII(1), 28
U.S.T. at 233).
100. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1175.
101. Id. at 1175-76.
102. Id. at 1174-75. The court distinguished United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888 (D.C.
Cir. 1989); Caplan v. Vokes, 649 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1981); and United States v. Cuevas, 847
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distinction was the lack of a "facts-offenses" nexus requirement in
the language of Colombian Decree No. 1860,03 a requirement that
does exist in the similar U.S. treaties with the United Kingdom s°4
and Switzerland.10 5 In the absence of the nexus language, the court
wrote, United States law would prevail, and therefore if the extradition offense and conviction offense bore the same codified statute
number, the doctrine was satisfied.' 06
The court acknowledged that "[t]he limitations which appear
in Decree No. 1860 are few" 107 and that "[i]n this case, the 'established by the facts language' does not appear in Decree No.
"
1860. " 01
Decree No. 1860 is not an international treaty signed by

the United States, but an internal Colombian decree. Article 1 of
the Decree provides that extradition shall be dealt with in accordance with public treaties.10 9 Thereafter, the Decree, in conflict
with the terms of the 1979 Extradition Treaty between Colombia
and the United States,'1 " sets out extradition procedures. Article
15(2)(a) of the 1979 Treaty contains the "same set of facts" language regarding "altered" prosecutions as do the British and Swiss
Treaties ." Congress hs not terminated the PiT-- and hough in
June, 1987, the Colombian Supreme Court of Justice ruled the
treaty invalid because of procedural errors,' 1 2 on October 3, 1989,
the court backtracked, holding that under principles of international law, Colombia must honor the treaty and that the treaty
trumped any inconsistent provisions in Decree No. 1860."' The
F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989).
103. United States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1175 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 107 (1992).
104. See Sensi, 879 F.2d at 895 (re U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 25, art. XI (1), 28
U.S.T. at 223).
105. See Cuevas, 847 F.2d at 1426 (re U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 25, art. IX, 31 Stat.
at 1932).
106. 948 F.2d at 1175-76.
107. Id. at 1174.
108. Id. at 1175 (emphasis added).
109. Colombian Decree No. 1860, supra note 61, art. L; see also Sherman, supra note
63, at 695-96.
110. 1979 U.S.-Colom. Treaty, supra note 63.
111. Id. art. 15(2)(a) (requiring that the offense be based on "the same set of facts
contained in the extradition request and its supporting documents").
112. Judgment of June 25, 1987, C.S.J. [Supreme Court of Justice] (Colom.), reprinted
in 27 I.L.M. 492 (1988); see also GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 291 (6th ed.
1992).
113. Judgment of October 3, 1989, C.S.J., 18 Jurisprudencia y Doctrine 882 (Colom.);
see Sherman, supra note 63, at 695-96. The court held that the Decree cured the procedural
defects in the 1979 Treaty (presidential approval), that the extradition Treaty was therefore
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court rendered this decision 17 days before the United States tendered its request for Abello. 1 4 Had the Tenth Circuit reasonably
assessed article 15(a)(2) of the 1979 Treaty, as it should have, its
attempt to distinguish the cases cited by Abello would have proved
difficult. Even were the treaty a nullity, respect for international
legal tradition should have required acceptance of the facts-offenses theory by a U.S. court. Satya Bedi points out that the specialty doctrine not only applies to offenses or facts, but that in the
absence of a treaty, the facts-offenses principle binds civilized
nations:
Many national statutes make extradition of the person
claimed subject to a guarantee or pledge (by treaty or municipal
law of the requesting state) that the surrendered person shall
neither be prosecuted nor punished for any act or offence other
than that which formed the ground of his surrender. This principle is generally accepted as implied when it is not stated, and
strictly observed even in the absence of any treaty ....

Such a provision is introduced to operate as a safeguard
against the abuse of surrender, because if the surrender would
mean full freedom to the requesting state to deal with the offender on whatever grounds it thought fit, the whole procedure

followed in the asylum state in investigating the nature of the
crime before extradition "would be rendered farcical."'" 6
In any case, a U.S. court should not have relied on the absence
of facts-offenses language in Colombian Decree No. 1860, a purely
internal decree struck in relevant part by the Colombian Supreme
Court and not ratified as a treaty by the U.S. Senate. Instead, the
court should have followed traditional international norms under
which the United States and most Western European states incorporate such language into their treaties."'
reinstated, and that any other provisions in the Decree which conflicted with the Treaty
were null and void. Sherman, supra note 63, at 695-96.
One U.S. court recently addressed the October 3 decision and the priority it arranges
between Colombian Decree No. 1860 and the 1979 Extradition Treaty. See United States v.
Martinez, 755 F. Supp. 1031, 1034, 1037 (N.D.Ga. 1991) (noting that the Colombian Supreme Court ruled that Decree No. 1860 is trumped by the 1979 Treaty still in effect, but
holding that the Colombian decision is not binding on the United States). Considering the
nexus between the two documents, the Georgia decision is curious.
114. United States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
113 S.Ct. 107 (1992) (the extradition request was made on October 20, 1989).
115. SATYA DEVA BEDI, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 149-50 (1968)
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).
116. See generally I.A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971). Shearer
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The court rejected Abello's argument that Colombian law
should apply under Paroutian,1 7 the case which declared that the
determination of what constitutes a "separate offense" should be
made not according to a "technical refinement of local law," but by
asking "whether the extraditing country would consider the offense
actually tried 'separate.' """ Paroutian,however, involved a trial
based on a different "offense": import'ing drugs rather than conspiring to do so. The "facts" tendered to the extraditing authorities were identical to those supporting the ultimate charge. Thus,
as the Paroutiancourt expressly declared, no violation of the specialty doctrine had occurred only because the requested country
was "fully apprised" of the facts. 1 9 In Abello, the problem was
precisely that the United States did not fully apprise the extraditing country of the facts.
B.

The Colombian Political Situation

The Abello-Silva court's most extraordinary factual blunder is
in its conclusion that "rilf the, Colombian government was satified
by the first indictment and granted the extradition request, it
would not object to prosecution for the same offenses under the
second indictment when the second indictment presented an even
stronger case."120 Such a conclusion is woefully blind to the political realities of Colombia.
In Colombia, the decision to extradite was, under the terms of
Decree No. 1860, a political one.12 Had the indictment tendered to
Colombia alleged that Abello was the number four person in the
Medellin Cartel, at the level of Escobar, Gacha and Ochoa, it is
likely that the political climate in Colombia would have prevented
extradition. "Colombians object to having their fellow citizens extradited and tried in the United States, a nation whose culture and
legal tradition differ markedly from those of Colombia, and whose
refers to the usage of "specialty" in the United States, "speciality" in Great Britain,
"specialite" in France, and "Spezialitat" in Germany, id. at 146 nn.1-5, and goes on to write
that "[tihe specialilty (sic) rule has been held to apply even in the absence of express treaty
stipulations." Id. at 146 n.4.
117. United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962).
118. Abello-Silua, 948 F.2d at 1173-74 (quoting Paroutian,299 F.2d at 490-91).
119. Paroutian,299 F.2d at 491; Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1174.
120. 948 F.2d at 1175.
121. Colombian Decree No. 1860, supra note 61, arts. 1-2; see also Sherman, supra note
63, at 695 (Decree No. 1860 "provid[es] for extradition proceedings to be carried out exclusively by the executive branch.").
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people are the primary users of cocaine.""'2
when a Cartel leader is involved.

This is especially so

Colombian citizens oppose deporting drug kingpins even more

stringently, for both symbolic (i.e., a refusal to admit that the Colombian justice system is ineffective) and economic reasons (were
the drug business to dry up, many would lose their only income).
Witness the impossibility of extraditing temporarily jailed Kingpin

Escobar, 128 or the murderers of seventeen Colombian Supreme
Court justices and presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galin
Sarmiento, all of whom apparently were killed for their pro-extra24

dition sentiments.1

Galin's murder occurred on August 18, 1989, just two months
2
before the United States tendered Abello's extradition request.' 1
Soon after, the Justice Minister resigned because of threats to her
family.2 6 In fact, on the date Escobar turned himself in, all extraditions of Colombian nationals ceased. 27 Escobar mandated suspension of extraditions to the United States before he would surrender.12 8 He also arranged to serve time in a luxurious "prison"
that he built in his hometown of Envigado, Colombia.' 2 9 These
events demonstrate the political power and persuasion wielded by
Cartel members over Colombian officials.
122. Sherman, supra note 63, at 666; see also id. at 692 (discussing the "strong, antiextradition feeling within Colombia").
123. Joseph B. Treaster, Drug Baron Gives Up in Colombia as End to Extradition is
Approved, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1991, at Al.
124. See Richard L. Fricker, A Judiciary Under Fire, A.B.A.J., Feb. 1990, at 54; see
also Scott A. Otteman, JuristsAlone, Unprotected, Slain Colombian Judge Warned, MIAMI
HERALD, Aug. 19, 1989, at A20 (claiming that a Colombian appellate court judge overseeing
drug cases foreshadowed his own death in an interview two months before he was
murdered).
125. See Colombian Presidential Candidate is Slain at Rally, N.Y. TIEs, Aug. 19,
1989, at A3; PresidentialFront-Runner Assassinated in Colombia, WASH. POST, Aug. 19,
1989, at A15.
126. Fricker, supra note 124, at 54.
127. Escobar turned himself in on June 19, 1991, but only after the Constituent Assembly voted overwhelmingly (51 for; 13 against; 10 abstaining) to ban extradition of Colombian
citizens to face trial. Peter B. Heller, Colombia, in CONSTITIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD, at viii (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1991).
128. See Treaster, supra note 123, at Al.
129. See James Brooke, Drug Baron's PrisonHas Every Comfort, Even Mom and TV,
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1991, at Al; Treaster, supra note 123, at A14.
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Collide-Practical

In 1989 any decision by Colombia to extradite was a political
rather than a judicial one. Decree No. 1860 is not an international
agreement between the United States and Colombia, but a Colombian executive decree issued under a state of siege declared five
years earlier by Colombian President Barcos's predecessor, Belisario Betancur Cuartas. 13 0 Article 1 of Decree No. 1860131 suspended Colombian law that required extradition be in accordance
with public treaties (e.g., in accordance with the 1979 Treaty)
solely with regard to drug-related crimes.' 32 It also established extradition procedures that conflicted with the terms of the 1979 Extradition Treaty between Colombia and the United States. 133
Article 2 of Decree No. 1860 vested full discretion to extradite
in the executive branch. The decree expressly eliminated judicial
review of requests for extradition. 18 4 Thus, the decision to extra130. Decree No. 1038 of 1984, DIARIO OFFICIAL, May 14, 1984, at 673. For a thorough
account of the events leading to and the basis in Colombian law for the state of siege, as well
as the circumstances surrounding the promulgation of Decree No. 1860 of 1989, see Sherman, supra note 63, at 683-94.
Sherman presents compelling arguments that U.S. domestic and international drug policy since the 1970s-particularly its extradition of foreign citizens to the United States for
trial on charges of violating U.S. domestic criminal laws abroad-is largely responsible for
the deterioration of the social, political, and legal order in Colombia and other Latin-American nations. Id. at 662-693.
131. Article 1 provides:
Articulo 1° Mientras subsista turbado el orden pfiblico y en estado de sitio el
territorio nacional, susp~ndese la vigencia del inciso 20, del de narcotrafico y
conexos y, en consecuencia, para efectos de la extradici6n de nacionales colonbianos y extranjeros requeridos par estos delitos, podrd aplicarse el tramite
previsto en el C6digo de ProcedimientoPenal, con las modificaciones que en el
presente Decreto se establecen.
Colombian Decree No. 1860, supra note 61, art. 1; see also Sherman, supra note 63, at 693
(discussing Decree 1860).
132. Sherman suggests that after the 1988 Presidential election, the Bush Administration pressured President Barcos to resume extraditions to the United States, ending the
two-year hiatus between the Colombian Supreme Court's revocation of the 1979 Treaty in
1987 and the U.S. election. Caught between overwhelming popular and legislative anti-extradition sentiment and an equally hostile U.S. government, members of Barcos's cabinet
allegedly bowed to American pressure and teamed with U.S. Department of Justice officials
to draft the text of the Decree. The assassination of Presidential candidate Carlos Luis
Galen on August 14, 1989, which Barcos attributed to drug traffickers, temporarily stunned
Colombians and forestalled major political opposition to the Decree, which issued four days
later. Sherman, supra note 63, at 691-93.
133. Colombian Decree No. 1860, supra note 61; 1979 U.S.-Colom. Treaty, supra note
63.
134. Under Article 2 of the decree, the judicial branch has no controlling influence:
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dite rested solely with political officers, who are constantly fighting
to maintain-or merely to acquire-control of a violent and turbulent nation.
If the purpose of the specialty doctrine is to protect the "security and sovereignty" of Colombia, as the Abello court wrote,
how could that court have concluded that Colombia would not be
adversely affected' 85 by the United States' failure to present the
second superseding indictment in lieu of the first? In terms of "security and sovereignty," especially after the murder of the justices
and the presidential candidate, the Colombian Executive's consent
to extradite a low-level trafficker have far less severe effects than
would a decision to extradite a Cartel leader. The Colombian public, with its easy access to American media, has little tolerance for
a government which turns over such people. The Colombian government's surrender of a minor criminal as a small, unnoticed gesture to appease the Americans placed the it in a difficult political
squeeze, because the United States alleged that the defendant was
involved in illegal endeavors far greater than those specified in the
extradition request. Trusting the U.S. government, Colombia
quickly found itself sold out for an American political victory.
Colombia's supposed failure to object at the second superseding indictment's issue is irrelevant to the question of whether Colombia would have objected at the outset of the process had the
extradition request been more truthful. Although Colombia might
not have extradited Abello due to political factors had it known
the true nature of the prosecution, an objection after extradition
would require the Colombian government to face a far different
political equation. The diplomatic debit incurred from requesting
the return of an already extradited "Cartel leader" (which would
anger the Bush administration, as it would cause much embarrassment in the eyes of the American press and public), would be far
greater than the harm incurred by merely refusing to extradite him
in the first place (which could be done through quiet diplomatic
channels).
Articulo 2.0 La concesi6n de extradici6n de nacionales colombianos o extranjeros por los delitos de nrcotrdfico y conexos, no requerird de concepto
previo de la Sala de Casaci6n Penal de la Corte Suprerna de Justicia.
Colombian Decree No. 1860, supra note 61, art. 2; see also Sherman, supra note 63, at 694.
135. Cf. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1175 ("There is, of course, nothing . . . touching
upon the dignity, security or sovereignty of [Colombia] itself which might give rise to diplomatic considerations.").
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In spite of the political factors that tended to prevent an objection by Columbia, it is important to recognize what the court
briefly mentioned, but never addressed: evidence suggests that Colombia did quietly object to the expanded prosecution through
diplomatic channels. 136 On March 8, 1990, the Colombian Embassy
in Washington, D.C., sent Diplomatic Note EJ-024 to the U.S. Department of State, objecting to the prosecutorial expansion:
The Embassy in Colombia ... wishes to manifest its knowledge
regarding . . .the Colombian citizen Jose Rafael Abello Silva
who has been extradited .... The Colombian Embassy has of-

ficial knowledge that the United States Embassy in Colombia
has not submitted a request to the Colombian Government in
order to amend or complement this [i]ndictment."'3
Although an objection by the extraditing country is not needed in
the Tenth Circuit for standing to raise the doctrine,1 38 such an objection is assuredly evidence that the requested country might
have reached a different decision had it known of the allegations in
the post-extradition indictment.
The Abello-Silva court made a leap in logic when it characterized the Paroutian court's test for specialty violations.'
The
Abello-Silva court wrote that a question which asks "whether the
asylum state would consent to extradition" is the same'4 0 as asking
"whether there is sufficient evidence in the request."'' Equating
these questions assumes that a nation would base its "consent"
substantially on the existence of "sufficient evidence" for an alleged offense in the request. That is nonsense in the context of
Colombian Decree No. 1860, where the executive branch makes extradition decisions on political factors rather than on legal
grounds. "Sufficiency of the evidence" is a judicial concept, and
under Decree No. 1860, the judiciary plays no role in the process.
While "sufficient evidence" to extradite may have existed, the executive branch was much more likely to weigh the evidence stated
136. Id. at 1173; see also Fricker, supra note 51, at 59 (discussing Diplomatic Note EJ024 from Colombian Embassy in Washington, D.C., to U.S. Department of State (Mar. 8,
1990)).
137. Fricker, supra note 51, at 59 (quoting Diplomatic Note EJ-024 from Colombian
Embassy in Washington, D.C., to U.S. Department of State (Mar. 8, 1990)).
138. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1173.
139. Id. at 1173-74.
140. Id. (emphasis added). The court used the term "[iln other words" to show its belief that the two questions support a single proposition. Id.
141. Id. at 1174 (emphasis added).
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in the request, not with blindfold and balance, but with a cleareyed bias and inclination for political survival. If the United States
had fully apprised Colombia of the "facts," the Colombian government probably would not have consented to Abello's extradition.
The Tenth Circuit manipulated reason and rationale, and presumed to place itself in the shoes of a foreign sovereign making an
extradition decision. The court seemed to assume that foreign sovereigns look not to their own domestic law and political exigencies,
but rather to U.S. legal standards when making internal decisions
about their own citizens. In an era of an increasingly conservative-and more dangerously, politicized-U.S. judiciary, the accruing results of diplomatic dishonesty should serve as a warning, especially since all extraditions from Colombia have ceased. The new
Colombian Constitution of 1991 guarantees native-born Colombians the fundamental right not to be extradited. 14 2 Colombia has
now made it virtually impossible to extradite its nationals to stand
trial in the United States. If dual criminality principles are satisfied, any Colombian national charged with a crime by a foreign na1 3
tion will be tried and sentenced in Colombia.
V.

THE BROADER THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ABELLO-SILVA

This Note has examined problems relating to the facts of the
Abello-Silva case. The glaring difficulty with the decision is not
merely the court's interpretation of those facts, but also the ramifications of its broad holding that "the relevant inquiry is the nature
of the offenses in the two indictments, and not the different 'facts'
alleged in support of the offenses."'4"
As the Abello court recognized, an asylum country will "extra142. CONSTITUCi6N POLITICA DE COLOMBIA art. 35. [hereinafter COLOM. CONST.]; see generally William C. Banks & Edgar Alvarez, The New Colombian Constitution: Democratic
Victory or Popular Surrender, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 39 (1991).
143. See COLOM. CONsT. art. 35.
The doctrine of dual criminality provides that one may only be extradited when the
charged offense in the extradition request is recognized as an illegal act under the criminal
statutes of both countries. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 579 (6th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 58 (1903).
For example, in Freedman v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 1252, (N.D. Ga. 1977), the
court denied extradition to Canada because no United States law recognized the charged
Canadian crime of "commercial bribery." Id. at 1261-62; see generally Sharon A. Williams,
The Double CriminalityRule and Extradition: A Comparative Analysis, 15 NOVA L. REV.
581 (1991).
144. 984 F.2d at 1174.
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dite only those individuals against whom a substantial case lies."' 4 5
Abello-Silva involved an "expansion" of the facts at trial. The
facts in the extradition request were less inculpatory than those
introduced at trial. What of the situation where the facts in the
extradition request are more inculpatory than the facts actually
used at trial? Should the conviction stand? The Tenth Circuit's
holding that the specialty test applies to "parallel offenses" and
not to "parallel facts" may create great problems.
A hypothetical clarifies this point. Were the levels of proof inverted under the Abello fact pattern, and therefore under Colombian Decree No. 1860, the defendant would argue that the original,
more incriminating allegations in the extradition request were a
mere ruse to secure extradition because the real facts did not establish the requisite "substantial case." If the government countered that the specialty doctrine bars only introduction of different
offenses, not the introduction of differing facts, under Abello-Silva
the government would win. Yet that seems to be exactly the type
of prosecutorial conduct which United States v. Rauscher'" intended to prevent.

Rauscher invoked the specialty doctrine when a federal prosecutor alleged one offense to secure extradition, but intended to try
the defendant on another charge. 14 7 Under Abello-Silva, a prosecu-

tor could allege damning facts to secure extradition, knowing that
the defendant would be tried on different, tamer facts. Is the first
occurrence necessarily more dastardly than the second? The answer depends on the purpose of the doctrine itself.
If the purpose of the specialty doctrine is to deter misrepresentations between nations,14 ' to foster international comity,'" and
to ensure that a host nation may reasonably "rel[y] upon the representations made" to it,150 then nations should not be rewarded
for a deceptive extradition request.
Even if an extradition treaty lacks the language of a "factsoffenses" nexus, the doctrine should control when false representations of fact violate its spirit. The doctrine's purpose "is to prevent
145. Id. at 1173-74.

146. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
147. Id; see supra text accompanying notes 13-18.
148. See 119 U.S. at 432.

149. See United States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417, 1426 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1016 (1989) ("The doctrine is based on principles of international comity.").

150. BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 360.
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punishment in excess of what the requested state had reason to
believe was contemplated."' 1 Or as the Paroutiancourt put it, the
doctrine "is designed to protect the extraditing government against
abuse of its discretionary act of extradition."15
Contrary to the doctrine's spirit, the Abello-Silva holding will
encourage prosecutors to trump up or falsify facts to support offenses when requesting extradition from foreign governments, because an asylum country will base its decision whether a "substantial case" exists on an examination of the extradition request.
There will be no penalty at the U.S. trial stage for proceeding
under facts different from the extradition request. There is no requirement that a prosecutor include a copy of the indictment or
arrest warrant in the request for extradition. Abello-Silva, therefore, stands in part for the proposition that no nexus need exist
between the facts alleged in an indictment and those in an extradition request. For unscrupulous government lawyers, Abello-Silva is
a license to mislead foreign governments.
Whether or not the government is fighting its "War on Drugs"
intelligently,"' few question that the purpose itself is noble.
Though one might argue that the judiciary has a responsibility to
assist the government in conducting that "war," when decisions
like Abello-Silva aid the government in a noble cause at the expense of foreign trust and international law, the integrity of the
American judiciary must be questioned.
Though moral rules have religious origins and originally applied only to individuals in search of salvation,"5 4 their application
to states soon followed, ostensibly to create societies in tune with
the moral values professed by the citizenry.1 5 5 Terry Nardin points
151. RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 477

cmt. b. (1986).
152. United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1962).
153. The effectiveness of extradition as a weapon in the war on drugs has occasioned
vigorous debate. Compare J. Richard Barnett, Note, Extradition Treaty Improvements to
Combat Drug Trafficking, 15 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 285 (1985) (arguing that extradition is
an effective weapon in the war on drugs), with Sherman, supra note 63 (arguing that extradition of Colombian nationals makes relations worse in return for a mere symbolic victory).
154. See generally TERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY, AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES
(1983).
155. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 181 (1961) ("[Ilt cannot seriously be dis-

puted that the development of law, at all times and places, has in fact been profoundly
influenced both by the conventional morality and ideals of particular social groups, and also
by forms of enlightened moral criticism urged by individuals .... ); see also NARDIN,
supra note 154, at 90-92.
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out that states misleading other states inevitably undermines international relations, and it is therefore the role of government to
prevent this deception.1 56
Mere political interests or even domestic law should not override moral considerations in the context of international law: "the
principles of morality are not one among a number of competing
interests and

. . .

cannot be subordinated to other interests. They

are, rather, the principles that govern the pursuit of all interests.' ' 1 57 That international law has often been used to justify mor-

ally questionable measures does not undermine the incorporation
of moral standards into international law.1 58 It proves instead that
international law is inseparable from the concept of morality, because morality serves as a measure of justification for a state's
act.1"5 ' When a state cannot show that its act satisfied a moral
benchmark, political moral pressure upon that state should follow.
The ultimate purpose of morality in international law is not a
theoretical pursuit of godliness, but the practical pursuit of peaceful coexistence. This may come at the expense of a state interest.
IntprnAtifol

morality "dem nrls, i

tn
i+

w

the
way, +1-
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1 60

because "internasubstantive purposes to formal constraints"
tional morality and international law provide the basis-often the
only basis-on which those who are engaged in pursuing different
ends can associate with one another." 6 '
States cannot achieve justice without adhering to concepts of
international morality. "Just conduct" is simply conduct which is
6
correct because it satisfies a legal or moral standard. " It is possible that justifiable conduct under one set of "standards" may not
constitute justifiable conduct under a different set.16 s
The idea of "justice," therefore, may have two prongs. The
156. NARDIN, supra note 154, at 39, 305. Nardin argues that governments must prevent
the undermining of observed moral limits of conduct and suggests that the idea of morality
may be expressed in terms of constraints necessary for cooperation. Id.
Similarly, Hart writes, "The common requirements of law and morality consist for the
most part not of active services to be rendered but of forbearances, which are usually formulated in the negative form as prohibitions." HART, supra note 155, at 190.
157. Marshall Cohen, Morality and the Laws of War, in PHILOSOPHY, MORALITY, AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 71, 88 (Virginia Held et al. eds., 1974).
158. See NARDIN, supra note 154, at 308.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 305.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 257.
163. Id.
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first is a formalistic notion, that society intends to distinguish just
from unjust conduct in codified law.16 4 However, codified laws
alone which define what is "just" and "unjust" conduct must have
an underlying meaning to fulfil the measure. Otherwise, laws would
be merely an Orwellian recitation of rules to follow in the name of
order. Codified rules without moral definition, the second prong,
would have no real influence beyond the state's power to enforce
them because they would be subject to complete abrogation at the
whim of the state's leaders.' 5
For laws to foster international coexistence, the idea of "just
conduct" must have a meaning and force which may not be
trumped by codified law.' 66 That is why notions of international
morality must be preeminent to any state's mere desire to cure the
ills which afflict its society. Therefore, the idea of "justice" is
empty when defined only in terms of codified law, for the idea has
one indispensable, "critical aspect; it allows for the criticism of
laws and institutions according to [standards of morality].'

1

67

Put

164. Id. at 257-58.
165. See HART, supra note 155, at 189.
[G]iven survival as an aim, law and morals should include a specific content. The
general form of the argument is simply that without such a content laws and
morals could not forward the minimum purpose of survival which men have in
associating with each other. In the absence of this content men, as they are,
would have no reason for obeying voluntarily any rules; and without a minimum
of co-operation given voluntarily by those who find that it is in their interest to
submit to and maintain the rules, coercion of others who would not voluntarily
conform would be impossible.
Id.
166. This position endorses a "naturalist" view of the law, as opposed to a "legal positivist" perspective. Naturalists prefer law based on moral customs for definition and view
treaties as mere expressions of those customs. Harry Brod, Law Thinking Itself: The Idealism of InternationalLaw, 10 CkRDozo L. REV. 1879, 1881 (1989) (reviewing DAVID KENNEDY,
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES (1987)). Thus, a naturalist-or to a certain extent even a
minimalist like Hart-cares not whether a treaty is or is not "in force," as those customs
upon which a treaty is based are by definition always in force. See Brod, supra, at 1881. To
a naturalist, it is irrelevant whether Colombian Decree No. 1860 or the 1979 U.S.-Colom.
Treaty is in effect, because standards of international morality and comity bind all nations.
The problem arises in deciding whether international conduct itself creates the custom
(hence duplicity is moral), or whether traditional moral customs must motivate the conduct
to validate that conduct as "just." This is the starting point for the positivists, who prefer a
devotion to treaty law because treaty language is based on consent. They view the lack of a
treaty as a lack of consent, and thus an absence of international agreement-or responsibility to conform-on the abdicated issue. Id. For world society to function, it is not necessarily true that laws must first quench the naturalist thirst for rules based on morality. See
HART, supra note 155, at 181. Because of its refusal to connect legal validity and moral
value, many have rejected legal positivism. Id. at 182.
167. NARDIN, supra note 154, at 258.
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succinctly:
The basis of international association lies in deference to practices that embody recognition of the fact that we must coexist
on this planet with others whom we sometimes share little beyond a common predicament. Such coexistence presupposes acknowledgment of certain common standards of conduct: that individuals and states are united on the basis of authoritative
common rules and not merely by their possibly convergent
desires. "
Lack of commitment to moral "rules" in the name of satisfying the desires of the state is at the heart of the Abello-Silva decision. Unfortunately, it reflects an attitude symptomatic of the U.S.
judiciary today. One need look no further for support of this proposition than the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in United
169
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, holding that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures did
not prohibit a warrantless search of a home in Mexico owned by a
States. 7 '
awaiting trial in the Unitedgiven
resident defendant
non-U.S.
right
prlvacy i naturnl, and
t~hat a riaht.
The prnnopoitlnn
(the unjust invasion of which is immoral) is the foundation of the
Yet Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for
Fourth Amendment.'
"the people" protected by the Fourth
that
held
rigidly
Court
the
of the United States, not all peopeople
the
only
were
Amendment
ple. 1' The Supreme Court of the United States essentially held
that a natural, god-given right accrued to Americans, but to no one
else. The Verdugo decision is a classic example of desire-driven
justice. The Court refused to be guided by higher moral concepts
because to do so would have been utterly inconvenient. It would
have defeated the State's immediate purpose of rule enforcement
in the hallowed name of order.
168. Id. at 324.
169. 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
170. Id. at 1059.
171. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-3 (2d ed. 1988).
Hart defines Natural Law as the proposition "that there are certain principles of human
conduct, awaiting discovery by human reason, with which man-made law must conform if it
is to be valid." HART, supra note 155, at 182.
Hart seems to be a minimalist, believing that while there are some "elementary truths
concerning human beings," the naturalist view of morality defining the validity of law is too
expansive. Id. at 189. Many laws are arbitrary yet valid because the need for order and
certainty in a society could almost never be obtained if only those laws based on morality
were valid. Id.
172. 110 S. Ct. at 1066.
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Within this context the Abello-Silva decision is not surprising.
If through narrow textual construction the Supreme Court denies
the application of the Fourth Amendment to a foreign drug-dealer
defendant brought before a U.S. court, it is likely that the courts
will find a way to exonerate a prosecutor who secures that drug
dealer's extradition by misleading a foreign government. A
thoughtful judiciary would recognize that desire-driven justice exacts too high a price.
VI.

CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL

The problems with the Abello-Silva decision are acute, yet
curable. Courts should interpret the doctrine of specialty as a bar
to prosecutorial variance regarding not only alleged "offenses," but
also "facts." Preeminent moral imperatives demand no less.
If courts are not ready to embark on such a radical journey
toward the moral higher ground, an alternative course may better
address the "offenses-facts," "order-comity" dilemma which current law so inadequately handles. In assessing specialty claims,
courts should balance the natural fluctuation in the quality of evidence over a period of time against the need to foster international
comity by preventing prosecutorial deception.
This balance should apply only when the facts in the request
for extradition and the facts actually used at trial are substantially
different. If the facts submitted in an extradition request were perceptibly less inculpatory than the facts later introduced at trial, a
rebuttable presumption would arise that the variance was due to
the natural flow of evidence garnered by prosecutors over time,
and therefore absent such a rebuttal, there would be no violation
of the doctrine. However, when the facts submitted in an extradition request were more inculpatory than different facts actually
brought out at trial, a rebuttable presumption of violation would
arise. Factors indicating whether there is a violation might include
the plausibility of the government's explanation for the variance,
differences in the quality of evidence tendered in the request and
at trial, whether or not an indictment was included in the request,
and the court's overall assessment of the veracity of the participating parties.
In sum, it cannot be reasonably argued that the doctrine of
specialty permits federal prosecutors to deceive foreign governments. The spirit of the doctrine, so well articulated by Rauscher
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over a century ago, 17 3 deems the principles of international comity
superior to immediate national desires, however noble, however urgent, harbored by well-intentioned prosecutors attempting to better their society with literalist notions of order. Such myopia, so
understandable in a society ravaged by drugs, yet ignorant of the
relationship between moral conduct and international coexistence,
is simply intolerable in a polity which deems itself "just." U.S.
courts should beware of aiding ostensibly noble causes when their
aid requires a morally blind adherence to stilted formal concepts of
to sacrifice its
order promoted by a government all too willing
7
victory."
political
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a
for
integrity
long-term
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173. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 432. The Court wrote that if it allowed the defendant's conviction to stand, "the Treaty could always be evaded by making a
demand on account of the higher offense defined in the Treaty, and then only seeking a trial
and conviction for the minor offense not found in the Treaty." Id. The deterrence of misleading conduct by federal prosecutors, therefore, is a central tenet of the doctrine.
174. Benjamin Cardozo wrote:
You think perhaps of philosophy as dwelling in the clouds. I hope you may see
that she is able to descend to earth. You think that in stopping to pay court to
her, when you should be hastening forward on your journey, you are loitering in
bypaths and wasting precious hours. I hope you may share my faith that you are
on the highway to the goal. Here you will find the key for the unlocking of bolts
and combinations that shall never be pried open by clumsier or grosser tools.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 23 (1924).
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